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Non-technical Summary
In the classic case fiscal federalism leads to economic growth by a more productive and possibly smaller public sector through higher preference homogeneity and enhanced intergovernmental competition. On the other hand, decentralized political decisions create inter-jurisdictional spillovers which may negatively affect growth by distorting local tax and fiscal incentives. In recent years, this discussion has led to a growing body of literature aimed at understanding the empirical link between the two phenomena. The results on the existence, direction or sign of such a link, however, are as ambiguous as ever.
The present paper takes a fresh look at the empirical relationship between fiscal federalism and output growth using a Bayesian model averaging approach. This approach is increasingly becoming a standard econometric tool in the empirical growth literature, because it offers a coherent procedure to deal with both model and parameter uncertainty in a context of weak theoretical guidance which has previously led researchers to choose their empirical specifications (explanatory variables and functional forms) on an arbitrary basis, or at best using some unknown rule-of-thumb rules. Surprisingly, however, the earlier literature on the link between growth and federalism -by definition being a part of this much larger literature on the determinants of economic growth and, thus, sharing the same methodological limitations -has never adopted these advancements.
Obviously, endogeneity and causality are the main concerns of these studies, but the methodological superiority of the present analysis allows for claiming that the results of previous research might have been additionally biased due to over restrictive model specification. In contrast, the results from a sample of 23 OECD countries over indicate that after controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity, there is no robust link, neither positive, nor negative, between output growth and fiscal federalism. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze

Introduction
A couple of decades ago decentralization used to be a matter of marginal importance for public economics scholars and for policy makers. Countries were constitutionally divided into federal or unitary systems and there were hardly any political or economic initiatives for restructuring. This was the post-World War II period, characterized by rapid growth in public spending. The resulting large government involvement in the economy eventually raised concerns over public sector performance and over its further potential in sustaining permanent economic growth rates. This brought the issue of optimal allocation of fiscal authority between different government layers to prominence in the academic and policy debates. Fiscal federalism of course remains a complex multidimensional phenomenon, but an important trade-off that has attracted much academic attention is whether the growth-stimulating benefits from making decisions at appropriate levels are outweighed by the costs of duplicating government efforts.
In the classic case fiscal federalism leads to growth by a more productive and possibly smaller public sector through higher preference homogeneity (Oates, 1972) and enhanced inter-jurisdictional competition (Tiebout, 1956, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) . On the other hand decentralized political decisions create inter-jurisdictional spillovers (Musgrave, 1959 , Oates, 1972 which negatively affect growth by distorting local tax and fiscal incentives. Less conventional arguments that could go in both directions range from economies of scale (Prud'homme, 1995, Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010) and macroeconomic stability (Ter-Minassian, 1997 , Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999 , Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006 to government accountability (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003) and institutional quality (Ahmad and Tanzi, 2002) .
The results of the growing empirical literature on the link between fiscal federalism and economic growth are at least as diverse.
1 The reason behind such inconclusiveness is that the impact of decentralization on growth has hardly been analyzed in a systematic man-ner (Feld et al., 2009 ). These papers typically analyze different cross-country samples with various measures of fiscal federalism and with diverse, often restrictive, methodologies. Davoodi and Zou (1998) , Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), Bodman (2011) , Baskaran and Feld (2013) are among those authors who provide evidence for a negative relation between federalism and growth, while Yilmaz (2000) , Iimi (2005) report opposite results. Woller and Phillips (1998) , Thornton (2007) do not find such a robust direct link. Thiessen (2003) tries to link these results together by arguing that the relation is inverse-U shaped, while Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) maintain that fiscal federalism can potentially enhance growth, but only conditional on good institutions. Case studies on federal countries such as Australia (Bodman et al., 2009) 2 , China (Zhang and fu Zou, 1998) , India (Zhang and fu Zou, 2001 ), Russia (Desai et al., 2005) , Switzerland (Feld et al., 2005) or the United States (Xie et al., 1999 , Akai and Sakata, 2002 , Stansel, 2005 , Hatfield and Kosec, 2013 ) again lead to ambiguous results.
According to Breuss and Eller (2004) where fiscal federalism is measured as the share of tax revenues, over which sub-national governments have the autonomy to fully or partly decide upon tax rates or bases. The initial cross-country estimates on the determinants of per capita growth find a moderately negative coefficient for the above measure of fiscal federalism (and for the federation dummy), but weakly positive coefficients for dummies capturing the existence of locally elected sub-national parliaments/governments. These results are, however, not robust to the inclusion of country (and time) fixed effects into the BMA model, suggesting that the results of previous research might be biased due to over restrictive model specification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data and the analytical framework. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. The last section 4 concludes and offers several directions for future research.
Data and Methodology
The first challenge of our empirical estimation is to find an accurate measure of the prevailing degree of fiscal federalism. Many of the previous empirical studies use IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS) to quantify fiscal federalism by computing the ratio of regional-to-total government expenditure and revenue (ExpDCT and RevDCT ). Despite its merits and popularity, however, concerns are rising over these widely used measures of fiscal federalism, as they severely overestimate the sub-national fiscal independence by failing to make an appropriate distinction between sub-national government's real fiscal autonomy and its administrative activities tightly regulated by the center. We attempt to tackle these issues by adopting a dataset constructed by Stegarescu (2005) , which supposedly captures the true amount of sub-national fiscal autonomy by differentiating tax revenue according to the degree of autonomy that the sub-national governments possess over the associated tax rates and tax bases. latter case have one of the highest autonomies in our sample (and in the world) over their spending and taxing decisions, and are thus competing with each other. Table 1 presents the summary statistics, sources and short descriptions of the employed variables.
To formally address the specification uncertainty of analyzing this amount of variables, we follow the recent advancements in the empirical growth literature and apply an already rather standard BMA approach (see for example Levine and Renelt (1992) , Sala-i Martin (1997), Fernandez et al. (2001) , Sala-i Martin et al. (2004) , Masanjala and Papageorgior (2008) , Moral-Benito (2012) , and Raftery (1995) or Durlauf et al. (2005) for a discussion on BMA or broader variety of econometric methods employed to study growth). In particular, we consider a set of linear equations where the GDP growth rate per country-year is regressed on a constant term and on any subset of up to the 25 hypothetical growth determinants (including measures of fiscal federalism) specified above.
Briefly, the idea is to a priori declare that the "true" model is unknown, which implies a departure from the classical methodology in which conditioning on a specified model is essential. Consequently, instead of traditional conditioning, the employed Bayesian inference attaches prior non-informative beliefs to the model parameters (i.e. coefficients and error variance). In the next -averaging -step, the (unconditional) estimator is computed as a weighted average of these conditional estimators. A formal and more detailed specification of the approach we apply is presented by Magnus et al. (2010) .
We add to the above by extending the analysis to a panel dataset. This allows including country fixed effects to tackle the issue of unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
The trade-off, however, is that we are risking to limit our available information to the inadequately low within-country variation of the fiscal federalism variables. 4 Indeed, it
is not uncommon to argue that the underlying features of federalism are mainly constitutional and, so, do not vary much over time. Thus, in the next section we present estimations using both pooled data to exploit the cross-country constitutional differences and data demeaned by country (and year) averages to control for unobserved country characteristics.
5
4 Baskaran and Feld (2013) present evidence on the within variance of these measures which are then exploited by applying country fixed effects models.
5 Lovell (2008) shows that this approach of demeaning data is equivalent to using fixed effects (we are constrained of using fixed effects dummies as the inclusion of further variables into the model makes the analysis computationally prohibitive). (1) is the baseline specification with pooled data, and model (2) extends the set of explanatory variables by including cross-country controls for initial conditions and for geographic differences. Model (3) is a variant of the latter specification but controlling for common time shocks, while models (4) to (6) -our most reliable specifications -additionally account for unobserved country heterogeneity. In models (1) to (4) the fiscal federalism measure entering the regression is the sub-national governments' revenue autonomy of first degree (RAut1 ), model (5) uses the softer measure of revenue autonomy of second degree (RAut2 ), while model (6) tests for a non-linear relation between growth and federalism. The last two models (7) and (8) serve as robustness by estimating the time fixed effects model (3) on 5-year averages data and on annual data excluding the case of Switzerland, respectively.
The first column of each model reports the estimated coefficient, i.e. the weighted posterior means of the regressors' coefficients and since it is not straightforward to interpret coefficient estimates that are averaged over many models of different size and form, we will be mainly interested in their sign (rather than their value). The second columns report the posterior inclusion probability that is the posterior probability that a variable is included in the model. As a guideline to compare to frequentist hypothesis testing, Raftery (1995) and Masanjala and Papageorgior (2008) suggest that a posterior probability of 50% roughly corresponds to a t-ratio of one in absolute terms. Although the BMA literature has not reached a consensus regarding a threshold value on the "significance" of posterior probabilities, such question does not rise in our estimation as a fair number of growth determinants clearly appear in the top rows of Table 2 with above 90% probabilities, while the inclusion probabilities of the rest are discontinuously low. The standard arguments for lower and more stable inflation rates is the reduced economic uncertainty and improved efficiency of the price mechanism, while the rate of lending interest rate is an indicator of healthy financial systems assuming that accessibility to cheap money positively affects capital accumulation and, thus, contributes to economic growth. Finally, the share of government consumption in GDP also has a high posterior inclusion probability, interestingly, indicating a reverse relation to economic growth.
Turning to the central variables of interest, initial cross-country estimates (models 1-2) find a significantly negative coefficient for the fiscal autonomy indicator -RAut1 -and for the time-invariant federation dummy -Fed Dummy -but weakly positive coefficients for dummies capturing the existence of locally elected sub-national parliaments or governments. These results are maintained when controlling for common time shocks (model 3), however they are not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects (models 4-6).
Likewise, no such evidence is found for the softer measure of local fiscal autonomyRAut2 (model 5) or for a quadratic relation (model 6) as some scholars suggest.
As discussed earlier, by including country fixed effects we are potentially running into the risk of limiting the available information on fiscal federalism to within-country variance that might be too low. A loss of significance could then just mean inadequate empirical specification rather than absence of such a link. Contrary to this argument, however, in models (7) and (8) Contrary to the findings of many previous empirical studies, which claim significantly negative or positive relations between growth and fiscal federalism, our analysis suggests that there is no such robust link. Obviously, endogeneity and causality are the main concerns of these studies, but the methodological superiority of our analysis allows us to claim that the results of previous research might have been additionally biased due to over restrictive model specification. As the contrast between models (1) to (3) on one side, and models (4) to (6), model (7) and model (8) of Table 2 on the other shows one particular source of such bias may well be the failure to properly account for cross-country unobserved heterogeneity. Excl. Switzerland
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Prob. Notes: Dependent variable is PPP-adjusted per capita GDP growth rate for each country and year. Reported results are based on a Bayesian Model Averaging estimator. "Coef." corresponds to the estimated coefficients, and "Prob." is the posterior probability that a variable is included in the model.
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In the present paper we take a fresh look at the empirical relationship between fiscal federalism and economic growth using a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach. BMA is increasingly becoming a standard econometric tool in the empirical growth literature, because it offers a coherent procedure to deal with both model and parameter uncertainty in a context of weak theoretical guidance. Surprisingly, however, the earlier literature on the link between growth and federalism -by definition being closely linked to the empirical growth literature and, thus, sharing the same methodological shortcomings -has never adopted these advancements. We aim at covering this gap and show that previous research which claims to have found a significant, either negative or positive, relation between growth and fiscal federalism is biased due to over restrictive model specification. In contrast, our estimations indicate that after controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity there is no such direct link.
One particular issue that has largely burdened the legitimacy of the literature on the link between fiscal federalism and economic performance is the tendency of oversimplifying the relation between the two highly multi-dimensional phenomena by comparing their aggregated values. As our results underline the importance of country heterogeneity, we believe that future empirical research should consider the channels through which different aspects of federalism influence different facets of the economy in different institutional settings by paying particular attention to the relevant mechanisms in detail. Other well known issues such as endogeneity and causality that are common to the growth literature in general, will of course remain important.
From a policy perspective, the absence of such a direct link implies that at least there is no trade-off between federalism and growth. This suggests that a careful institutional design may still allow the realization of many benefits of federalism that originate from, for example, increased preference homogeneity or through enhanced inter-jurisdictional competition.
